Expand description

Primitives for GRANDPA integration, suitable for WASM compilation.

Structs

  • Proof of voter misbehavior on a given set id. Misbehavior/equivocation in GRANDPA happens when a voter votes on the same round (either at prevote or precommit stage) for different blocks. Proving is achieved by collecting the signed messages of conflicting votes.
  • A GRANDPA justification for block finality, it includes a commit message and an ancestry proof including all headers routing all precommit target blocks to the commit target block. Due to the current voting strategy the precommit targets should be the same as the commit target, since honest voters don’t vote past authority set change blocks.
  • An opaque type used to represent the key ownership proof at the runtime API boundary. The inner value is an encoded representation of the actual key ownership proof which will be parameterized when defining the runtime. At the runtime API boundary this type is unknown and as such we keep this opaque representation, implementors of the runtime API will have to make sure that all usages of OpaqueKeyOwnershipProof refer to the same type.
  • A scheduled change of authority set.
  • An AuthorityList that is encoded with a version specifier. The encoding version is updated any time the AuthorityList type changes. This ensures that encodings of different versions of an AuthorityList are differentiable. Attempting to decode an authority list with an unknown version will fail.

Enums

  • An consensus log item for GRANDPA.
  • Wrapper object for GRANDPA equivocation proofs, useful for unifying prevote and precommit equivocations under a common type.

Constants

Traits

  • APIs for integrating the GRANDPA finality gadget into runtimes. This should be implemented on the runtime side.

Functions

  • Verifies the equivocation proof by making sure that both votes target different blocks and that its signatures are valid.
  • Check a message signature by encoding the message as a localized payload and verifying the provided signature using the expected authority id.
  • Check a message signature by encoding the message as a localized payload and verifying the provided signature using the expected authority id. The encoding necessary to verify the signature will be done using the given buffer, the original content of the buffer will be cleared.
  • Encode round message localized to a given round and set id.
  • Encode round message localized to a given round and set id using the given buffer. The given buffer will be cleared and the resulting encoded payload will always be written to the start of the buffer.
  • Localizes the message to the given set and round and signs the payload.

Type Definitions